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Hauerwas and the Redemption of Bioethics
M. THERESE lYSAUGH T

Stanley Hauerwas has been called many things, some of them publishable and some, it is safe to say, not. He calls himself a Christian theologian. He holds a chair in theological ethics. Time magazine named him
"America's Best Theologia n:' "a thorn in the side of Christian complacency;' an "unlikely" and "radical" pacifist.' But there is one label that
one does not find attached to Stanley Hauerwas-whether in Time, on
various websites devoted to his work, or anywhere-and that would be
the label "medical ethicist."
Stanley Hauerwas is decidedly not a medical ethicist. Should there
be any doubt on this point, Hauerwas lays all rumors to rest with his
1993 essay: "Communitarians and Medical Ethicists: Or, 'Why I am
None of the Above:"' I am not out to prove that Hauerwas is, in fact, a
medical ethicist. Yet one might wonder: why does he feel i t necessary
to defend himself against such a charge? Simply put: the prima facie
evidence seems to argue against him.
1,

Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Theologian: Chrisllan Contrarian;' Time (September 2.7,
Online: hllp://www.time.com/t!me/m~gazine/article/o,9I7I ,10oo8s9,oo.html.

2.001 ).

2 ...Communitarians

and M edical Ethicists: Or 'Why I am None of the Above,"' in

Dispatches from the Fronl (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994) t 56-63. After
tlu: publication of this essay, Hauerwas's writings in medical ethics taper oif dramalically. Of Hauerwas' forty or so scholarly articles on medicine and medical ethics, only
about six were writlen after 1993. After the mid- t990s, his work In medical ethics
shirts toward co-edited volumes of original essays.
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As he himself acknowledges, his claim "may seem disingenuous"
since, as he admits, he has "written about medicine and in particular
medical ethics:'J TI1at is a bit of an understatement: the corpus of his
writings in medicine and medical ethics comprises at least forty scholarly articles, one thematic compilation, one monograph, and three coedited volumes:1 And he certainly looks from a distance like a medical
ethicist. Some of his first essays concern the questions of abortion and
the ethics of death.s He testified, in 1979, before the Ethical Advisory
Board of the then-Department of Health, Education, and Welfare on
the topic of in vitro fertilization, along with other leading figures in the
emerging field such as Paul Ramsey and Leon Kass, who later chaired
the President's Council on Bioethics.6 In 1998, he delivered a plenary
address at the first annual meeting of the then newly-created American
Society ofBioethics and Humanities/ And in the Time encomium, three
of the examples Jean Bethke Elshtain chooses in her 785-word account
to best crystallize Hauerwas's identity and importance as a theologian
include his comments on fetal tissue research , euthanasia, and persons
with disabilities.
All this alone would be enough lo arouse suspicion. Yet the most
intriguing evidence lies in one singular detail: in the second edition of
On Moral Medicine (1998), that premier anthology of theological perspectives in medical ethics, Stanley Hauerwas's name occurs more often
than any other scholar but one. It occurs far more than those whose
names stand as leading figures in the field of medical ethics-Daniel
Callahan, Richard McCormick, Lisa Sowle Cahill, James Gustafson,

3· "Communilarians ant.! Medical Ethicists," 162
4· By (Jn C estimate, his writings on m~.-'(licine aud medical ethics constitute approximately 15 percent of his published writings.
5. See "Abortion and Normative Ethics;' ·~bortion: The Agent's Perspective;' "The
Ethics of Death: Letting Die or Putting to Death;' and "1be Christian, Society, and the
Weak: A Mcdilation on the Care of the Retarded,» in Vision and Virtue (Notre Dame:
University of Notre D ame Press, 1981; originally published by Fides, 1977) 127-46,
147-65, t66- 86, and 187-96, respectively.

6. '''Ihcologica! Rellection on In Vitro Fertilization," in Suffering Presence:
Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally Handicapped, and the Church (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986) 142-56.
7· "Sinsick;' in A Better Ho/'e: Resources for a Church Confronting Capitalsm, Postmodernity, and America (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 1000) 189- 2oo.
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Karen Lebacqz, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Allen Verhey. 8 Only one name
graces the 1,004 pages of On Moral Medicine more often than that of
Hauerwas-that ofPaLtl Ramsey (by almost a two to one margin).
Paul Ramsey is interesting company to keep if one is going to
deny being a medical ethicist. For by Hauerwas's own account, it is with
Ramsey that Christian ethics became medical cthics. 9 If Hauerwas is
not a medical ethicist, then how is it that he has exerted an influence on
the conversation on "theology and medical ethics" almost equal to that
of Paul Ramsey? How do we account for the rather imposing body of
literature that he has penned and his constant participation in the field
of medical ethics over its entire forty-five-year history? Alternatively,
given the significant and substantive role that medicine and medical
ethics has played in his work, how is it that Hauerwas in fact is not a
medical ethicist?
I will argue that medicine and medical ethics play such a significant role in the work of Stanley Hauerwas because on some level he
remains-with his sisters and brothers in Christian ethics-an heir of
liberalism. How to narrate that inheritance remains an ongoing challenge, but his deference to medicine must be a piece of that account.'"
But Hauerwas's significant influence on the conversation charted in On
Moral Medicine is only partly explained by the privileged place held
by medicine among Christian ethicists from the 1970s forward. More
importantly, Haucrwas challenges that same liberalism by relentlessly
unmasking the irreducibly political character of medicine, a character
obscured by mainstream medical ethics. Consequently, he offers an irreducibly constructive political response to medico-moral questions,
narrating a distinctive role not simply for abstract and disembodied
religious "beliefs" but for the church itselfvis a vis medicine and care
for the sick. Does he take his political analysis far enough? 'That remains
8. Paul Ramsey's name occurs 270 times in On Mom/ Medicine, 2nd edition.
Hauerwas takes second place with 115, well ahead of Gustafson (81), Daniel Callahan
(I! 1), McCormick (s8), Verhey (40), Lebacqz (30), Cahill (23) or Engelhardt (18).
<J. "How Christian Ethic~ Became Medical Ethics: 11te Case of Paul Ram5ey,» in
Religion and Mcdiml Ethics: Looking Back, Looking Forward, ed. by Allen Verhey
(Grand Rapids:Eerdmans, 1996) 61-Bo. Also in Wilderness Wanderings {Boulder, CO:
Westview, 1997) 124-40.
I(J. My thanks Ln Joel Shuman for helping me to formulate this and for his helpful
l~·edhack on earlier drafts oft his essay.
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unclear. Nonetheless, he has laid the groundwork for theologians and
Christian communities to move beyond bioethics toward a new way
of thinking about-and embodying-an authentic and grace-filled
Christian engagement with medicine that unleashes God's power of
healing and redemption in the world.

Politicizing Ramsey
To situate H auerwas's work in medical ethics both within that discipline and within bs overall project we must first situate him within the
story of Christian ethics as an academic discipHne in America, a story
Hauerwas himself has narrated. ' 1 His account traces the great tradition
of Protestant liberalism from Rauschenbusch's Social Gospel, through
the Niebuhrs' realism and responsibility, to Gustafson's question Can
Ethics Be Christian? and Ramsey's in-principled covenantal Jove. As
Hauerwas argues, Lhe focus of Christian ethics in America has always
been America.
Hauerwas in many ways remains the last scion in the great tradition of Protestant liberalism. While not a Protestant liberal himself, he
remains immersed in this very same tradition via both academic ancestry and his decision to choose as s parring partners its giants and other
figures. His work over the course of his career has been a sustained
argument with and from within this tradition.
This ident ity accounts in large part for his constant engagement
with medicine. In narrating the history of Christian ethics, Hauerwas
observes that with Reinhold Niebuhr, the all-encompassing scope of
the social gospel (which included economics, politics, family and more)
narrows to focus almost solely on politics. With Ramsey the focus narrows even further:
Ramsey would no longer speak of institutions being saved, but
he certainly assumed that Christianity had formed somethin g
called Western civilization that bore the marks of the gospel. I
think moreover, it was no accident that given that presmnption,
medicine became a crucial practice that allowed him to develop
11. See "How Christian Ethics became Medic.'\[ Ethics" above and "Christian Ethics
in American Time;• in A Better Hope, 5 5- 70. 'This essay is, obviously, indebted in many
way.~ lo "How Chrlstian Ethics Became Medical Ethics:'
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that perspective. The church may no longer have social power,
but at least we still have medicine.. __ Moreover medical e thics,
or b etter the practice of medicine, exemplified for Ramsey the
moral commitments at the heart of Weslern civilization that do
or at least should animate uur politics and economics .... It is
... medicine, at least Ramsey's reading of medicine, that carries
the Christian commitment to care tor the neighbor as ensouled
body. Therefore, the commitment of the physician to care for
the patient prescending [sic] aU other moral and social considerations provided Ramsey with a practice he sorely needed to
sustain Christian ethics as a discipline in service to t he world. ' 2

Thus, just as Haucrwas emerges as a newly-minted theologian in the
late 196os, medicine becomes for Protestant liberalism one of the fundamental carriers of Christian civilization.') Ramse"fs landmark book
Patient as Person, published in 1970, is largely hailed as the first monograph in the nascent field of medical ethics. Where the contemporary
discipline ofbioethics marks its new beginning, Hauerwas perceptively
recognizes a subtle yet critical shift: medicine becomes not simply a
new area for Christian ethicists to ply their craft, but begins to displace
the state in their imaginations.
As the heir-apparent, Hauerwas takes the tradition in two directions. On the one hand, one could say that Hauerwas Niebuhrizes
Ramsey. With Hauerwas, medicine and medical ethics again becomes
politics, or rather Hauerwas relentlessly highlights the political character
of medicine and medical ethics. From his earliest essays, he holds that
insofar as "the moral concerns that are basic [to the medical profession]
involve the character of the physician, the patient, and the community
that sustains th em __ . discussions of medical ethics must, therefore,
involve issues of political philosophy and in particular the status of
special relations in societi'' 4 While medical ethics generally refuses to
admit the political nature of the idealized space of the physician-patient
relationship, Hauerwas repeatedly dem.onstrates how issues in medicine and medical ethics are shaped by particular and often contested
understandings of the relationship between individuals and their com12.

"How Christian Ethics Became Medical Ethics;• 68, 71.

13. Ibid., 7H.
14. ''Medicine as a Tragic Pmfcssion," in Truthfulness aml Tragedy (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1977) 1 86.
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munities. He identifies the ways that medicine is increasingly shaped
by societis larger commitment to political liberalism, particularly its
vision to "insure autonomy as an end in itself:'•s a vision that "renders
all relations that are less than fully 'voluntary' morally problematic [and
which attempt] to make the physician-patient relationship conform as
nearly as possible to a contract between two voluntary agents:''6 1hus
he recognizes more clearly than others that medical ethics is little more
than "a strategy in liberal political practice:'' 7
One might be tempted to argue that medicine serves, for Hauerwas,
simply as a p]aceholder for his larger critique of philosophical liberalism, particularly in its emphasis on individual autonomy, its privileging
of choice, and its refusal to articulate substantive ends. Yet while critical
of the way Christian ethics appropriates medicine, on the other hand,
medicine stands for him as one of the few places in American culture
where one can find a substantive moral practice in its own right:
Yet exactly to the extent that medical care has remained committed to those it cannot cure, medicine provides one of the
more profound practices on which we can draw in our culture
for moral example. I suspect ... that so many of us who have
been associated with ethics h ave been drawn to medicinethat is, the actual practice of medicine rather than the theory
of medicine-because we have discovered in m~Jicine what a
substantive moral practice actually looks like?''8

Hauerwas's account of medicine relies heavily on the work of Alasdair
Macintyre, and it is in medicine that Hauerwas finds his most useful
example of Macintyre's account of ethics!9 Drawing on Macintyre,
Hauerwas argues that medicine is in its fundamental nature a "moral
art:'>o It stands as a "practice with internal goods and standards of excellence that give it a moral intelligibility unlike most of our institutions:'''
11. "Medicine ~ a Tragic Profession," 196-97 .

of Medicine:· ln Su,Dering Presence, 41-42. See
also "Communitarians and Medical Ethicists:' 160-62.
16. "Authority anJ the Profession

17. Ibid., 158.
18. Ibid., 163.
19. This should come as no surprise, given how deeply Macintyre's account of ~:th
ics is shaped by his own engagemen t with medicine.
20.

"Medicine as a Tragic Profession; L85; Suffering Presence, 13.

21.

Suffering Presence, 8.
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As such, it "is an activity-practice-that morally transforms its
practitioners." 22 Macintyre's understanding of the role of authority
within traditloned practices becomes central to Hauerwas's account of
medicine.>>
Thus, medicine holds a peculiar place in Hauerwas's corpus, a place
that raises two questions. First, though not uncritical of the directions
in which medicine is heading, he treats medicine with a surprising and
important deference. Given that, one might ask: does he completely
escape his history? As medicine became for Ramsey the bearer of the
ldnd of moral presuppositions and practices that should be characteristic of Western civilization, medicine becomes for Hauerwas the bearer
of Alasdair Macintyre's account of a practice, one of the few remaining traditioned-spaces with substantive ends, authority, and potential for reasoned argument wherein the virtues can be cultivated and
embodied. 24
While Hauerwas does not make Ramsey's mistake of making
medicine the bearer of Christian commitments, he does seem find in it
the kind of moral presuppositions and practices that should be characteristic of Western civilization:
If any one intuition underlies these essays, it is the recognition of
what an extraordinary gesture it is for a society to set aside some
to dedicate their lives Lo the care of the ill ... because we are

unwilling to abandon others who need help. 1l1erefore medicine
as a moral practice draws its substance from the extraordinary
moral commitment of a society to care for the ill ... I have not
tried to argue that such a view of medicine necessarily requires
theological presuppositions in order to subsist. Indeed, I do not
believe it does. However, I have suggested that such a medicine
may well require a community to sustain its practice, particularly in a world such as the one depleted by Engelhardt. ·while
not "sectarian" in my intent, I do think the kind of medicine I

22. "Communitarians and Medica[ ELhicists," 163
23. "Authority and the Profession of Medicine:' 39-

!101· example, Hauerwas champions authority in medicine not only because he
thinks it necessary foe the authentic practice of medicine but because medicine might
provide some insight into the concept of authority in general that will be transferrable
to other conLcxts. Sec ''Authority and the Profession of Medicine," 39 and 42.
24.
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try to portray in these essays will become increasingly difficult
in a society dedicated to freedom as the overriding value.>;
Hauerwas is clear that like Ramsey, the medicine he respects does not
"need Jesus' preaching of the kingdom" for its ethics.' 6 Does he, however, succumb to the same critique he makes of Ramsey, that "like a
doctor who is more likely to find the diseases she has been trained Lo
find;' he finds in medicine the issue for which his ethics is designed? 17
Does he make medicine one of the fundamental carriers of his understanding of the moral life, finding confirmation of the presumption that,
though it is un der assault, virtue ethics does in fact remain instantiated
in Western culture?
Second, given this privileged place that medicine holds in
Hauerwas's thought, one might ask whether his critiques of contemporary medicine go deep enough. Hauerwas rightly attends to medicine
as politics, and recognizes that a fundamental dynamic behind contemporary medicine and bioethics is an exercise of power, masked by
Weberian technocracy and recourse to formal instrumental rationality. 18
Yet his critique of contemporary medicine remains largely restricted to
its bureaucratization and loss of telos!9 He attributes our inability to
define the limits of medicine, for example, to an undue emphasis on
autonomy.
But perhaps there is more behind contemporary medicine than
simply a political philosophy premised on the autonomy of the individual. Perhaps his analysis needs more Nietzsche than Aristotle. Perhaps
contemporary medicine and medical ethics is not only a politics but
a biopolitics. Such a reading would demonstrate how medical ethics
25.

Suffering Presence, 13-14.

26 . "How Christian Ethics Ikcamc Medical Ethics;' 78.

27 . lbid.

2IL "Correlatively," he notes "the patient is made even more power]c$s in order to
legitimate the illusory authority derived from technique. Patient autonomy is therefore
asserted as the only alternative to redress the unjust power of the physician over the
patient," "Communitarians and Medical Eth icbts:' 162.
29. For example: He recognizes that "medical care [ha~ become] increasingly just
another form of liberal btll'caucracy that must be ~ubject to the same kinds of rules so
char<~.ctcristic of the w:ider political life. I therefore take medical ethics to be hul one
form which that kind of bureaucratic maintenance assumes;· "Communitiarians and
Medical Ethicists;· 1 62,
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not only channels political philosophies or how medicine has been increasingly deformed by contemporary consumer-driven U.S. culture.
ll would also analyze how the state (and more recently the m arket)
effectively shape and regulate both individuals and the U.S. (or now
global) population through techniques, technologies, and institutions
that manage and engage individual bodies. A biopolitical reading of
medicine would suggest thal beyond being malformed by an economics of consumption veiled by myths of indivi.dual autonomy, medicine
has become a means of policing populations and medical ethics has
become its handmaid.
Consider, for example, a recenl proposal for a policy of national
conscription or "compulsory participation'' in biomedical research that
appeared in a recent issue of one of the premier journals in bioethics,
the American Journal of Bioethics.30 The author, Rosamond Rhodes, is
concerned that current rules governing human subjects' research "give
special weight to the protection of the vulnerable" thereby "too often
limit[ing] research:' 3 ' Rhodes proposes legislation requiring "every U.S.
resident to perform some research service every ten years."P No one
would be exempt, including those without decisional capacity. One
would have no choice about whether to participate in human subjects
research; it would be a duty: "In the same way that we have endorsed
laws that require us to pay taxes and to serve on juries, reasonable people
should accept an obligation to periodic service as research subjects:' 33
Yet autonomy would not be jettisoned. All research participants would
have the freedom to choose which protocol they would participate in.
One could not invent a more fitting exemplar of bioethics as biopolitics. Rhodes' proposes a wholesale reorganization of the production
and management of the bodies of U.S. resident~ for research. This pro30. Rosamond Rhodes, "Rethinking Research Ethics,"

Amerimn joumal of

Bioethics 5 (2005) 7-28. For a more extensive discussion of Rhodes' argument, see my
"Docile Bodies: Transnational Research Ethics as Bi(lpolitics;' journal of Medicine and
PWosophy 34 (lo09) 384-408. This issue of the Journal of Medici11e and Philosophy is
brings the work ofPoucault to bear on biocthics. Sec also Jeffrey P. Bishop, ''"Biocthics,
Biopolitics, and the Sovereign Subject of Death;' journal of Medicir1e and Philosophy
33:6 (2uoll) 338- 57·
.~ 1. Rhodes, "Rt:thinking Research Ethics;· 7.
32. Ibid., 16.

33. Ibid., 15.
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posal, if implemented, would increase the number of persons subject to
research in the U.S. from approximately 2.3 million to approximately 3 s
million per year. This would be stunning mobilization of human embodiment. It also aims not simply at increasing the number of subjected
bodies but at increasingly ordering all sectors of the U.S. population,
particularly those currently considered vulnerable and therefore protected, toward the interests and ends of research. The professed justification for this radical shift is the improvement of the welfare of the
U.S. population (i.e., the common good) as well as the enhancement of
the freedom of members of vulnerable groups. The real effect, however,
would be to systematically and exponenti<1lly enhance the power and
profit of the transnational, biotech research industry. Far more than a
commitment to the principle of autonomy is operative here.
I raise the question of biopolitics for three reasons. First, it is
particularly intriguing given Haucrwas's thoroughgoing attention to
the importance of embodiment for medicine. 34 Biopolitics takes as a
starting point the intersection of bodies, technologies, and institutions.
Hauerwas, from his earliest writings, challenged the gnosticism of contemporary bioethics and its focus on the will, identifying the body as
the key locus where the practices of commodified medicine and the
Christian tradition meet, an insight unique to Hauerwas amongst his
early confreres in medical ethics. Second, in spite of his constant attention throughout his writings to the relationship between the church
and the state, especially in the U.S., he does not explicitly identify the
state's role in the negotiation of the church's relationship to medicine.
While medicine may have become the church for Ramsey and others,
it may also in the early 1970s have become a mask for a more subtle
34- Hauerwas claims that our bodies exercise a particular aulhurily in medicine.
"We have been given our bodies:' he notes, "which will not let llS do whatever we think
we should be able to do" ("Pmctidng Patience: How Chrigtians Should Be Sick;' in
On Mom! Medicine: 11teo/ogica[ Perspectives in Medical Ethics, 2nd ed., cd. Stephen E.
Lammers and Allen Verhey [Grand Rapids:. Eerdmans, 1998] 367). Rather, "through
our bodies, we arc f(Jrccd to face our need for one another, and through learning to
acknowledge that need, we di~covcr our 'control' comes only through trust in Cllhers" CAuthority and the Profession of Medicine;' so). Those who have particularly
c.levdnped Hauerwas's attention to the body include Joe] Shuman, Body ofCompassion:
Ethics, Medicine, lmd the Churc/1 (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2003); Joel Shuman and
Brian Volck, Reclaiming the Body: Cllristiai'IS and the Faithful Use ofModern Medicine
(Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2006); and Gerald McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition:
Bioethics, Technology and the Body (New York: SUNY Press, 1997).
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exercise of power by the state and market made more palatable by the
unassailable medical goals of healing, relieving suffering, and curing
the sick. Finally, it: as we shall see below, the church is to provide an
alternative p olity for medicine and caring for the sick, it will be crucial
to be clear on the nature of the medicine it is engaging. Is the church
simply engaging a historic, traditioned practice that has inadvertently
been co-opted by philosophical liberalism and can be re-directed to
more fully embody its own ends and wisdom, while simultaneously
serving the ends of the church? Or is contemporary medicine so deeply
wedded to the ends and purposes of the state and market that a very
different kind of engagement between the church and care for the sick
will be required?
The «Place" of a Christian Politics of Medicine
Whether Hauerwas's account of the politics of medicine goes deep
enough, his ability to recognize and probe the inherent political dimension of ~edicine and medical ethics stands as one of his signal
contributions to medical ethics. TI1is focus rankles an emerging discipline of medical ethics designed in part to obscure the fundamen tal
political machinery of medicine by focusing on formal, abstract principles. Moreover, his concept of politics is resisted by those who would
seem to be potential allies, insofar as it transcends the interest-group,
public-policy politics of liberal Niebuhrian realism, in both its classic and contemporary adherents. Rather, instead of politics-as-usual,
Hauerwas presents a robust, constructive, and necessarily political
alternative. While nascent in his earliest writings, his signature move
emerges when he begins to craft the essays eventually compiled in A
Community of Character, namely, that Christian reflection on medicine
must be rooted in the politics of the community that is the church.
Hauerwas calls the church to account, to live into the politics that
it is. Again and again, he asks: what kind of community .is necessary
to care for the ill, whether in crisis or the long term?J 5 To be such a
place, or to be the sort of community where particular terms such as
abortion, euthanasia, suicide a nd so on "remain morally intelligible"
35. "Salvation and Health; Why Medicine Needs the Church;' in Suffering Presence,
74-75·
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is, he maintains, a deeply political act.J 6 For the Christian prohibition
of actions like abortion or euthanasia, or more positively, the Christian
advocacy for the disabled, "is correlative to being a particular kind of
people with a particular set and configuration of virtues:'J 7 Ironically,
however, most Christian reflection on medicine has formed its moral
arguments ".in the moral framework of a liberal culture, as though the
issue could be abstracted from the kind of people we should be:'JR
For Hauerwas one of the fundamental questions for those reflecting on m edicine from a Christian perspective pertains not to medicine
itself but to the identity and political character of local congregations
and the church. Central to these questions are the "nicer issues of theology-such as Trinitariatl and ecdesiological issues" that became so
tangential for Ramsey and his predecessors in the tradition. 39 For it is
these very doctrinal convictions, embedded in Christian practices like
baptism and hospitality, that give the church its particular identity and
determine the direction of its care.
For Hauerwas, this theological identity developed and reinforced
through scripture and sacrament reshapes Christian perception of the
critical issues.in medicine and Christian action in response. One particular example, especially in contrast to the literature of mainstream
bioethics, is his relentless attention to the care for the vulnerable and
the responsibility of the church to be the place of care for such persons.
As he notes early on, "There is nothing in Christianity that teaches the
preserving of life as an end in itself- not even the preserving of the
life of another. Rather the gospel demands the care of the weak, which
is quite a different matter."~o Be it a pregnant woman, a fetus, a person
suffering a chronic illness, a dying patient, a research subject, orchildren, Hauerwas returns· again and again to the question of what kind
of community the church must be to welcome, care for, nurture, and
sustain those in their midst and in society who are the weakest and
most vulnerable,
36. "Abortion: Why the Arguments Fail," in A Communlly of Character (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Datne Press, l 9H l ) 224.
37· Ibid., 214.
38. Ibid.

39. "How Christian Ethics .Became Medical Eth.ics;' 76.
40. "Ethics o f Death;' 177.
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This commitment takes its clearest form in his continued attention
to questions concerning the disabled, particularly those with mental
disabilities. Persons with disabilities find themselves especially vulnerable to a bioethics centered on autonomy and choice; as recently as ten
years ago, it was acknowledged that the "disability rights critique has
not yet met with a sustained, respectful analysis by the bioethics or
medical communities:·~ · a position that has not significantly changed.
Yet in one of his earliest essays, Hauerwas retlected on "The Christian,
Society, and the Weak: A Meditation on Care of the Retarded:'11 His
commitment to the disabled, and particularly to the Christian care for
the disabled, has continued unabated, taking its most recent form in a
book co-authored with Jean Vanier, Living Gently in a Violent World
(zoo8)Y
Thus, for Hauerwas, Christian reflection on medicine starts not
solely with medicine but with the church. But Hauerwas does not oppose Christianity and medicine. Rather, while continuing to protect the
autonomy of medicine as a profession, he argues that medicine-if it is
to be able to be true to the internal ethos that comes from its traditioned
history-needs the church as a political space: "Thus, medicine needs
the church not to supply a foundation for its moral commitments, but
rather as a resource of the habits and practices necessary to sustain the
care of those in pain over the long haul. For it is no easy matter to be
with the ill, especially when we cannot do much for them other than
simply be present. .. :'44 In other words, while medicine does not necessarily require theological presuppositions or a theologically-formed
community to exist, Hauerwas does maintain that at least in our contemporary situation, medicine practiced outside a theological context
will find little hope for its future: "to believe that such a presence is what
41. Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch, cds. Prenatal Testing arzd Disability Rights
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000) ix.
42. "'Ihe Christian, Society and the Weak: A Mcdilalion on the Care of the
Retarded," in Vision and Virtue, 1.1!7-96.

43. One of the most important interpreters ofHa\1erwas's work in the area of disability has been Brilish theologian John Swinton who has explored its further implications for the care of persons wilh disabilities as well as with mental health issues. See,
among other works, his Rcsurre,ting the Person: Friendship und the Care of People with
Mental Health Problems (Na.~hville: Abingdon, 2ooo).
44. "Salvation ami Health;' 81.
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we can and should do entails a belief in a presence in and beyond this
world, And it is certainly true many today no longer believe in or experience such a presence. If that is the case, then I do wonder if medicine
as an activity or presence is possible in a world without God~'·15
Thus, Hauerwas argues, "medicine needs the church~' Medicine
needs a political infrastructure that will allow it to subsist as a moral
practice in its own right, without becoming distorted by the politics of
contemporary liberal culture. As he notes:
The reason that Christian and non-Christian find ourselves
dominated by our 'concern for health' is that in lhe absence of
the church, medicine cannot help but dominate our lives. For
medicine has become a powerful practice without end, without context, without any wider community to give it purpose.
Accordingly, nothing could be more important today than for
Christians to recover a Christian practice of medicine shaped by
the practices of the church, and in particular baptism.16

What exactly a Christian practice of medicine shaped by the practices
of the church looks like, however, is the growing t:dge of his work. Often
within his essays, his discussions of medicine and of the church remain
relatively autonomous from one another. How, exactly, the practices of
medicine and the practices of the church intersector mutually inform
one another often remain in Hauerwas's work somewhat formal.
But others have begun to flesh out his vision, both in the annals of
academic theology as well as in the life of the church. Elsewhere his vision has become embodied in concrete, particular, and surprising ways,
in "answers" far more interesting and life-giving than simply figuring
out "who decides~' To be clear, such Christian engagement with medicine does not look much like "medical ethics" generally understood.
Nor does it fit in the carefully constructed marginal spaces allotted for
"religious voices" by bioethics within the clinical setting or the public
forum. Nor does not look like hospital ethics consultation shaped by
four principles and techniques of conflict mediation.
Rather, it takes its bearings from the work of those like Jean Vanier.
Vanier and the LArche communities most clearly embody Hauerwas's
vision of the Christian practice of medicine. Here the Christian practice
45. ThiJ.
46. "Sinslck:' 199.
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of medicine concerns not the rarest of occasion al decisions in crisis moments but an entire reshaping oflives, individually and as communities;
nor abstract beliefs and principles but the day-in-and-day-out practices
of life together of the broken and those who are not yet so vulnerable. It
requires "leaving our own milieu" as it were and working "from a new
vision of human beings and their relationships with each other and with
God:' 47 Hospitality and care for the weak are, in the Christian practice
of medicine, not unidirectional, but mutual. The strong learn from the
weak and are fundamentally, irrevocably, and powerfully ch anged.
Other exemplars are akin to LA.rche-discrete intentional Christian
communities devoted to care for and life with the sick: Dame Cicely
Saunders and hospice; Christ House for care of the homeless and St.
Joseph's house for care for those with HIV/AIDS in Washington, D.C:18
Such communities stand as witnesses to the profession of medicine as
well as to the broader Christian community; if the church were to fully
embody the identity to which Hauerwas calls it, separate instih1tions
like l:Arche, hospice and St. Joseph's house might nol be necessary. 4 '1
But what if local congregations were to understand that they are
called to be communities in wh ich God's grace works through the practice of medicine-where the congregation as a whole comes to incorporate the disabled arnong them, to welcome and support those who
find themselves pregnant and unmarried, to care for the elderly in their
midst, to care for the sick. What might that look like? It might look like
Austin Heights Baptist Church. 5°
'17· "Timeful Friends: Living wilh the Handicapped," in Sanctify 1hem in the Tm th:
Holirwss Exemplified (Nashville: Abingdon, 1998} 153.
~8. David Hilfiker, Not All of Us Are Saints: J\ Doctor's journey with the Poor (New
York: Hill & Wang, 200 4).
49. Sec, for example, M. 1heresc Lysaught, "Pntclicing the Order of Widows: A
New Call for an O ld Vocation;' Christian Bioethics 11 (2005) 51-68.

so. Other important cxamplars would include: Lysaught, "Practicing the Order
of Widows"; Curtis Freema n, "What Shall We no With Norman? An Experiment
in Communal Discernment;' Christian Bioethics 2 (1996) 16-41; Kay Toom bs,
"Vulnerability and the Meaning of Illness: Reflections on Lived Experience;· in Health,
Healing, and Human Flourishing: Religion, Medicine, and Moral Anthropology, edited
by Roberto Dcl!'Oro and Carol R. Taylor {Washingto n, DC: George town University
Press, 2oo6) 119-40; Joseph Kolva, "The Question o f Abortion: Christian Virtue
and Government Regulation;· Mennonite Quarterly Review 79 (2005) 481-504; and
Shuman and Volck, Reclaiming the Body.
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A small Baptist church in the heart of Texas, Austin Heights had
prayed to God to increase the size of their congregation. What God
sent them were local gay men dying of AIDS (not exactly the answer to
prayers a Southern Baptist Texan congregation expected) . Pastor Kyle
Childress recounts how a request cmne to the church: to provide food
for men who had lost their jobs, their homes, and often their families
because of their diagnosis. In 199l, before the advent of the triple cocktail, these were men who were dying. As Childress narrates:
[l ]t began with lead ing a food drive, but of course it did not
end there. Befot'e long delivering food to men with AIDS turned
into visiting the men, which turned into the most basic forms of
care: taking them to the doctor (when we could find one who
would see HIV/AIDS patients), running errands, going to the
pharmacy, and so on. All of this led lo the discovery that not all
persons with AIDS were men: we met and began helping support families in which the mother had received an IV during
pregnancy and the baby was born with HIV: We also discovered
families, especially older East Texas couples whose sons were
diagnosed with AIDS, upon whom the toll of caring in an atmosphere of ostracism was overwhelming. 51

Eventually the congregation, after much prayer, decided to welcome
these men (and women and children) into their congregation for
worship:
We prepared and trained and planned for this first worship service, and we also prayed. We prayed a lot. We prayed because we
were scared, partly because we did not know who would come
or if anyone would come and partly because we were still trying
to learn wh at to do when someone with AIDS did come to our
church. We prayed because we wanted to practice the hope and
hospitality of Jesus Christ for persons and fam ilies caught in a
downward spiral of despair and ostracism. In other words, even
though we knew that Jesus did not slam the door in people's
faces, we were nervous about what would happen when the
d o or was op ened.
W hat h appene<l is that we had people from the highways
and the byways streaming in. This side of the New 'Jb:aament
I had never seen anything like it. Almost everyone in ou.r own

AIDs:·

5 t. Kyle Childress, ·~u stln Heights and
Christian Reflection: Health (Waco,
TX: Center for Christian Ethics at Baylor University, 2007) 71.
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congregation showed up because we knew it was going t o take
all of us to do this. And though we expected a few people with
either HIV or full-blown AIDS, we did not expec t fifty. 1/ITe certainly did not expect the large numbers of parents and grandparents and siblings and babies, families who had members with
AIDS but could not talk about it.
1hrough the door people came, packing om little church.
Bobby literally had to be carried by friends because he was so
weak from being in the last stages of AIDS. C arl and Tim began
crying when they came in the door because it had been so long
since they were welcomed into a church. Bill confessed to me
that his stomach had been in knots over the fear of walking back
into a Baptist church. Brandy, sitting with a six-month-old in
her arms, cried because her baby son had HIV from a blood
transfusion she had received during pregnancy. 52

In the end, the church did grow. Men with AIDS joined the church
and others sought them out simply because they were impressed with
"the AIDS church." But as Childress notes, that was not the main point:
"when we were praying for God to help us survive as a church, we assumed that the operative word was 'survive: Now we know that the operative word was 'church.' God helped us be the church of Jesus Christ.
We were nol called to survive, but to be the Church. All the rest was and
is in God's hands." 5 ~
Reconciliation and Medicine: Redeeming Bioethics
Austin Heights Baptist Church embodies but one example of what a
Christian practice of medicine looks like. Authentic Christian engagement with medicine depends as Childress notes, on grace, the work of
the Spirit through the Body of Christ in the world. As such, it cannot
be formulaic or dist illed into four principles and universally applied to
achieve consistent, measurable outcomes. While the church has a finite
set of convictions and practices that must necessarily shape its identity,
its life together, and therefore its processes of discernment, God only
works through particular, concrete people in particular places with
specific and often different needs. As such, it can be hard to predict
p. Ibid., 72.

53· Ibid., 73-
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what the Christian practice of medicine will look like in each particular
place. One key characteristic of God's grace is that it takes forms we
could never expect or anticipate-such as the incorporation of sick gay
men into a Southern Baptist congregation in Texas and the unimaginable, liberatory transformation of those within that congregation, both
HIV-positive and not.
Nonetheless, congregations can certainly learn from one another-and I hope many will learn from Austin Heights Baptist Church.
But while Christian engagement with medicine may well look different
in different contexts, such engagement wilJ be characterized by at least
one common trait that we see at both Austin Heights and LArche: at
the center of these stories is the reality of reconciliation, a reconciliation only possible in Christ who through forgiveness overcomes the
violence of the world.
As is signaled by his most recent book, Living Gently in a Violent
World, Hauer was has paved the way for rethinking the Christian practice of medicine as a practice of reconciliation or peacemaking. 'The
field of bioethics has, from the start, presumed an ontology of conflict
(life and dealh dilemmas), incessantly used the language of war, and
has taken one of its primary tasks to be the mapping of the parameters
for the use of unconsented-to foTce (e.g., through the determination of
who is a person or a non-person) . From his earliest writings, Hauerwas
has been concerned with the "rhetorical violence" perpetrated through
the aegis of medical ethics, a concern that remains as equally valid forty
years later.s~ A key task for theological ethicists going forward is to continue to unmask this violence and to provide an alternative rooted in
the central Christian practices of forgiveness and reconciliation.Sl
54· "Abortion and Normative Ethics;' 127; and "Must a Patient Be a Person?" ln

Truthfulness and Tragedy, u9. One of Hauerwas's most unique and crucial contributions to medical ethics has been his attention to lan~lagc-to the "grammar" of moral
descriptions-and the relntionship between language and perception. As he states: "We
can only act in a world we can see and we .need to be taught to see by leaming to say,"
(uAbortion, 'fl1eologically Understood" in The Chr.wch and Abortion: bt Search of New
Gmund for a Response; edited hy Mich.acl Gorman, Ruth .Brown, and Paul Stallsworth
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1993) 53. Sec also "'Ihc Demands and Limits of Cl!.rc: On the
Moral Dilemma ofNeonat~l Intensive Care," in Truthfulness and Tragedy, \70. ·

ss. See, for example, M. 'Therese Lysaught, "Love Your Enemies: Toward a Christoform Biocthic," in Gathered fo r the Journey: Mora/Theology in Catholic Perspective,
ed . Davir.l M. McCarthy 1111d M. Therese Lysaught (Grand R~pids: Eerdmans, 2007)
307-28.
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Thus, while a key task for Christian theologians going forward will
be to assist congregations in becoming the.kinds of communities that
can engage medicine in a myriad of creative and faithful ways, we cannot
turn from unmasking the violence and politics inherent in the contemporary infrastructure of medicine and medical ethics. For if medicine
and medical ethics have indeed become forms of biopolitics, the ability
to redirect medicine to the service of the church rather than the service
of the slate or market may well be more difficult. Important, too, will be
further analyses of the new political economy of medicine, as globalization renders the modern nation state less powerful. Hauerwas's analyses
stop short of accounting for the operative but often masked economic
engines that underlie the rhetoric of autonomy and choice. Hauerwas's
insightful critique of the way in which the operative "end" of medicine
has become little else than the denial of finitude via the prolonging of
individual lives can be re-read instead as the logical outworkings of the
economic engine of consumer capitalism. j~
Every history ofbioethics notes that key players in the birth of the
field were theologiansY It may well be that the re-birth of bioethics,
or better the redemptive transformation of bioethics as the Christian
practice of medicine, will also be led by theologians, thanks to the work
done by Stanley Hauerwas. In concluding his account of how Christian
ethics became medical ethics, Hauer was states that in Ramsey and those
who followed, "Christian ethicists continue lo leave the world as they
found it." 58 If theologians continue to faithfully develop the ground56. Of the constant themes running through Haucrwas' writings on medicine
and medical ethics one 8lands out most clearly: that medicine in its essence is a transcultural practice of learning to live with finitude CAuthority and the Profession of
Medicine," 48), that medicine in its contemporary distortion has become a practice
centered on the denial of death, and that to ht! a Christian is to be part of a community
wherl! we art! trained lo die early ("Communilarians and Medical Ethicists:· l63). I
imagine that there are few more tangible reminders of the fact that one is going to
die, and perhaps sooner than later, than a festchrift put together by one's students,
many of whom themselves arc well into or passing middle age. Writing such an essay
has equally been a reminder to me that Stanley will die, again sooner than later. That
realization has made this one of the most difficult essays I have ever written.

57. See, for example, LeRoy Walters. "Religion and the Renaissance of Medical
Ethics in the United States: l965-1975:• in Theology and Bioethics, ed. Earl E. Shelp
(Dordrccht: Reidel, 1985) 3-16; and Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics (New
York: Oxford University Pres~. 2003).
58. "How Chr[stian Ethics Became Medical Ethics:' So.
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work laid by Stanley Hauerwas, they will certainly not leave the world
as they have found it. 'Ihe world will know the transformation that can
only come through God's grace.

